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In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the United States experienced a mo-
mentous conservative turn. We know its broad outlines: increased levels of religious dis-
course in public life; attacks on secularism and multiculturalism in the cultural and edu-
cational spheres; a weakening commitment to reversing historic patterns of 
discrimination; the rolling back of welfare programs; a sharp increase in income inequal-
ities; and a massive and punitive incarceration of racial minorities. How did this all of 
this come about? 
Over the past two decades, historians have puzzled mightily over explanations. 
They have identified origins, mapped ideational worlds, and described patterns of politi-
cal and legal activity. The three books reviewed in this essay make important contribu-
tions to these literatures, although they do so in two distinct ways. Two of them, the 
books by Kruse and Laats, explain the conservative turn “positively” by focusing on the 
ideas and activities of conservatives themselves. The third, the book by Schiller, explains 
the conservative turn “negatively” by exploring instead the failure of conservatism’s ad-
versary: liberalism. 
This essay is organized as follows. Part I introduces the three books and makes ob-
servations specific to each of them. Part II situates the three books within a longer narra-
tive, that of the emergence of anti-foundational thinking and of responses to it in Ameri-
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can intellectual life. 
I. TOWARD THE CONSERVATIVE TURN 
A. Kruse and Laats: The Labors of Conservatives 
Kevin Kruse’s One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Chris-
tian America conveys its argument in its title. Kruse states at the outset: “Like most 
scholars, I believe the historical record is fairly clear about the founding generation’s 
preference for what Thomas Jefferson memorably described as a wall of separation be-
tween church and state, a belief the founders spelled out repeatedly in public statements 
and private correspondence.”1  
Some might take issue with this observation on the ground that some states contin-
ued to fund churches well into the nineteenth century, but that would be beside the point. 
Kruse’s real target is contemporary Americans’ stubborn belief that theirs is, and has al-
ways been, a Christian country. In order to demolish that belief, Kruse assigns it a pre-
cise—and rather recent—historical origin. Doing so proves that it was “invented.”2 
Kruse argues that America’s public embrace and performance of its Christian reli-
gious identity is a mid-twentieth century phenomenon. However, among the more star-
tling claims of the book is where in mid-century American history it locates that point of 
origin. Historians before Kruse have argued that, in response to the Cold War struggle 
against “Godless Communism,” Americans in the Eisenhower years began to accord re-
ligion an increasingly prominent role in public life and to adopt public mottos and sym-
bols that were overtly religious. Kruse contends, however, that such historians have 
“misplaced their origins.”3 The rise in overt public religiosity, he argues, was not a func-
tion of the Cold War, but had its origins instead in the domestic politics of the 1930s and 
early 1940s. At that time, corporate titans began actively to recruit enterprising clergy-
men to promote a new political vision embodied in the idea of “freedom under God.” 
This was a kind of Christian libertarianism that identified as its enemy “not the Soviet 
regime in Moscow, but Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal Administration in Washing-
ton.”4 In other words, it is corporate opposition to the modern administrative and regula-
tory state that is the source of America’s public religiosity. 
When a book makes a point of specifying precise historical origins for a given de-
velopment, it makes itself vulnerable to having its proffered origin point questioned. At 
the very beginning of the book, to bolster his claim, Kruse observes that “[t]he percent-
age of Americans who claimed membership in a church had been fairly low across the 
nineteenth century, though it had slowly increased from just 16 percent in 1850 to 36 
percent in 1900.”5 That percentage remained steady in the early twentieth century, but 
then shot up to sixty-nine percent by the end of the 1950s.6 These extraordinary statistics 
                                                            
 1. KEVIN M. KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA INVENTED CHRISTIAN 
AMERICA xiii (2015). 
 2. Id. at xiv. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. at xv. 
 6.  KRUSE, supra note 1, at xv. 
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suggesting that Americans were more religious in 1960 than they were in 1860 challenge 
many received wisdoms about the difference between the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries. If they shake up received wisdoms, that is all to the good. But these statistics also 
raise many questions, not just the obvious ones about the accuracy of the early statistics 
and their comparability to more recent ones, but also whether “claiming membership in a 
church” might be the best or most accurate way of measuring religiosity, even public re-
ligiosity. Could it not equally be the case that the formal “claiming membership in a 
church” might be more meaningful in a thoroughly secularized society (the United States 
in 1960) than in a society in which religious thought and activity was so much the norm 
as to not bear flagging (the United States in 1860)? Determined to show how corporate 
America “invented” Christian America, might Kruse also not be underestimating the im-
pact of the Cold War, changing norms of ecclesiastical organization, religious opposition 
to abortion and contraception, the role of the black church, and the like? 
But there is more. In locating corporate opposition to the New Deal as the origin 
point of America’s post-war public embrace of religiosity, Kruse reads the history in a 
rather specific way. The increased prominence of religion in American public life, in 
Kruse’s rendering, is the product of “politics,” the result of organized opposition to the 
politics of regulation and redistribution that characterized the mid-twentieth century ad-
ministrative state. As a political explanation, Kruse’s book is effective. The book pains-
takingly maps the web of relationships and organizations that bound politicians, industri-
alists, businessmen, conservative ideologues, the media, and clergymen. We get a sense 
of the cast of lively characters and how they interacted with each other. Occasionally, 
belying the promise of the book’s subtitle, the corporate relationship to the public role of 
religion is somewhat attenuated. This is especially true of the sections dealing with reli-
gion in the schools. 
However, one might well ask whether an overtly “political” account of the public 
religiosity of post-war America is the only—or even the best—way to explain the phe-
nomenon. Is Kruse’s attempt to specify historical origins and to map networks a good 
way to grasp the forms and styles and experiences of modern American public religiosi-
ty? Does it tell us how Americans in the post-war period thought or felt or experienced 
religion in relationship to the public sphere? In final analysis, Kruse’s is not a book about 
the public meanings of religion for Americans. At the heart of the question lies the fol-
lowing concern: does the unveiling of the origin, the demonstration that something is 
“invented,” reveal the most important or interesting thing we need to know about a par-
ticular historical development? 
In The Other School Reformers: Conservative Activism in American Education, 
Adam Laats focuses on conservative activism in the realm of education through an ex-
amination of four different struggles scattered across the twentieth century: the 1925 
Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee; the American Legion’s and National Association of 
Manufacturers’ attack on progressive textbooks in the late 1930s; the movement against 
progressive education in post-war Pasadena, California; and the backlash against multi-
cultural textbooks in 1970s West Virginia.7 According to Laats, these four school battles 
                                                            
 7.  ADAM LAATS, THE OTHER SCHOOL REFORMERS: CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 
(2015). 
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“raised issues of perennial interest to conservatives everywhere: evolution, science, tradi-
tional education, progressive education, . . . sex, youth, delinquency, and the nature of 
American culture.”8 To say that educational conservatism has been marked by themes of 
“perennial interest,” is not, of course, to suggest that it has not had a history. In the 
1920s, educational conservatives were more concerned with evolution than race. Race 
did not become an explicitly articulated object of concern until after World War II. Laats 
also argues that, in contradistinction to intellectuals, educational conservatives did not 
distinguish rigorously among libertarianism, anti-communism, Burkean traditionalism, 
or religious thinking. At the core, however, seems to have been tradition: “Educational 
conservatism has been the tradition of defending tradition itself.”9 
Laats’s account intersects with Kruse’s in interesting ways. Just as Kruse brings to 
light a humming network of conservative organizing, Laats shows the hard work that 
went into educational conservatism: protesting, picketing, publishing blacklists, fighting 
for control over school boards, and so on. In his account, as in Kruse’s, conservatives 
were not merely reacting on the basis of unexamined impulses, but were keen strategists. 
Laats offers us, however, a different chronology that implicitly raises questions about 
Kruse’s account. Where Kruse would have us see the origin point of “Christian Ameri-
ca” in opposition to the New Deal, the fact that Laats begins with the 1920s Scopes tri-
al—itself a very public echo of nineteenth century battles between Christians and Dar-
winists—suggests that “Christian America” might be a little older than Kruse would 
have it. But Kruse also might have something to teach Laats. In my view, Laats could do 
more by way of exploring the genealogy of the “tradition” that (he says) educational 
conservatives have always sought to defend. If Kruse is correct, the religious symbols 
that Americans have taken as entirely “traditional” are of shockingly recent vintage, most 
barely half a century old. Might educational conservatives not have been creating “tradi-
tion” in the act of defending it? 
Laats’s approach to conservatives strikes a different note from Kruse’s. Unlike 
Kruse’s overtly “political” account, which keeps conservatives at a critical distance, 
Laats seeks to understand them. His book begins with an admission of naiveté. As a pro-
gressive schoolteacher in the 1990s, Laats believed that “schools should train each new 
generation to critique and question all received wisdom.”10 He assumed that anyone who 
disagreed with this position would be “from an eccentric fringe, a collection of kooks 
who did not understand modern education.”11 Imagine his surprise, then, when a mother 
who objected to an addition to her child’s curriculum revealed herself to be “enormously 
educated, articulate, caring, and even a little bashful.”12 
As Laats glances back, he finds many precursors who registered a similar surprise 
upon encountering conservatives. There is a long history, it turns out, of expressing 
amazement that conservatives are not as benighted and backward as one had previously 
thought. Thus, when H.L. Mencken headed down to Dayton, Tennessee to report on the 
                                                            
 8.  Id. at 5. 
 9.  Id. at 13. 
 10.  Id. at 1. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  LAATS, supra note 7, at 1. 
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Scopes trial of 1925, he had expected to find “a squalid Southern village, with . . . inhab-
itants full of hookworm and malaria,” but found instead a “country town full of charm 
and beauty.”13 Similarly, in mid-century California, when the journalist David Hulburd 
met the conservative leader Louise Padelford, he was surprised to find an Ivy League-
educated woman armed with a Ph.D. in romance languages. Padelford was also physical-
ly disarming. She had “clear blue eyes that look out at the world with wide-open frank-
ness; her ear is keen, her wit quick, and her smile enchanting.”14 Finally, Alice Moore, 
who was at the heart of the conservative attack on multicultural textbooks in 1970s West 
Virginia defies expectations when she reveals herself to be “witty, engaging, and insight-
ful.”15 
What is one to make of such repeated expressions of surprise, this inveterate tradi-
tion of finding conservatives less boorish and more charming than one had expected? In 
the case of Laats, but also Mencken and Hulburd, the surprise registers on an aesthetic 
(and also deeply gendered) level that reveals the distance—yet not fully covered—that 
separates conservatives from those who study them. If scholars are to come to terms with 
conservatives, we might need to do more to think “with them,” I would argue, than we 
have done to date. Instead of registering surprise that all conservatives are not backward 
and reactionary, we might try to ask how conservatives’ ideas challenge our own. 
B. Schiller: The Failure of Liberalism 
Where Kruse and Laats focus on the work of conservatives, Reuel Schiller’s Forg-
ing Rivals: Race, Class, Law, and the Collapse of Postwar Liberalism gives us an ac-
count of liberalism’s failures.16 Beginning around the mid-twentieth century and for 
about a quarter century following the end of World War II, in a polity dominated by the 
Democratic Party, American liberals revealed strong commitments to the regulatory and 
welfare state, on the one hand, and to ending discrimination, on the other. Both were dif-
ferent strategies for reducing inequality, the former resulting in a series of social pro-
grams, the latter targeting discrimination based on status. Together, these strategies made 
the United States a more equal country: by 1973, the country’s richest one percent held 
only eight percent of its wealth.17 
However, during the last quarter of the twentieth century, Schiller argues, these 
two strategies had followed sharply different tracks. Social welfare programs came under 
attack from Republicans and Democrats alike, while formal commitments to ending dis-
crimination and promoting pluralism, while far from perfect, remained in place. Dispari-
ties grew enormously. By 2009, the top one percent held eighteen percent of the nation’s 
wealth, the numbers returning to the inequality levels of 1940.18 
While scholars have offered various explanations for these developments, ranging 
from the rise of conservatism to the emergence of the global economy to the career of the 
                                                            
 13.  Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15.  Id. at 190. 
 16. REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW, AND THE COLLAPSE OF POSTWAR LIBERALISM 
(2015). 
 17.  Id. at 4. 
 18.  Id. 
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Civil Rights movement, Schiller identifies as the cause the contradictions—what he calls 
the “structural flaws”—built into the legal regime of postwar liberalism.19 As he puts it: 
 
This regime attempted to implement the principles of democratic ma-
joritarianism at the same time that it sought to protect the rights of mi-
norities and individuals. It struggled to do so using both judicial and 
administrative mechanisms. These mechanisms came to interfere with 
one another, just as the contradictions between the law’s substantive 
goals came into conflict. The result was a fatal weakening of liberal-
ism.20 
 
Schiller’s preferred site for exploring these contradictions is what he calls the “two 
signature legal regimes of postwar liberalism: labor law and fair employment practices 
law.”21 Although both legal regimes sought to limit employer discretion, they did so in 
distinct ways that eventually ended up conflicting with each other. Labor law worked by 
empowering democratic majorities in the form of unions; it operated through the mecha-
nism of the administrative state. Fair employment practices law, on the other hand, was 
“profoundly antimajoritarian in nature” to the extent that “[t]he desires of the majority of 
employees in the workplace were irrelevant to implementation of employment discrimi-
nation law”; it relied heavily upon courts.22 
Through a series of skillfully drawn vignettes mostly set in California, Schiller 
traces the trajectories of these two different legal regimes. He maps the temporary alli-
ances and the eventual breakdown of cooperation between white unions and African 
American workers. Each side was convinced of the rightness of its position. Acutely 
aware of how hard it had been to win freedom from the interference of anti-labor courts 
in the early twentieth century, and jealously guarding the privileges assured them by the 
New Deal, white unions resented the interference of courts. They saw this as a judicial 
infringement on democracy, the encroachment of undemocratic “law” upon democratic 
“politics.” African-American workers, on the other hand, were acutely aware that the 
self-governance of white labor unions had consigned them to the lowest rungs of the la-
bor hierarchy. Democratic majoritarianism had brought them precious little. If they ini-
tially (and unsuccessfully) sought to bypass labor unions and bargain directly with em-
ployers, by 1970, they had won a powerful set of legal entitlements—embodied in 
employment discrimination law—that would “cripple American labor, and shatter its re-
lationship with the civil rights movement.”23 
According to Schiller, the consequences of this conflict were devastating. Ameri-
can liberalism, once committed to racial equality and economic equality became a differ-
ent creature in the late twentieth century: “Its commitment to racial egalitarianism had 
grown, while its mechanism for reducing economic inequality had begun to atrophy.”24 
                                                            
 19.  Id. at 248. 
 20.  Id. at 5. 
 21.  SCHILLER, supra note 16, at 7. 
 22.  Id. at 8. 
 23.  Id. at 11. 
 24. Id.  
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By the time the American economy hit a wall in the 1970s, Schiller observes, liberalism 
had lost the ability to overcome the crisis. It had also created wedges between white and 
black workers. The consequence was the rise of political conservatism, with its resulting 
losses for workers and racial minorities, in the last quarter of the century. 
Schiller’s story about “structural flaws” and the way they caused the unraveling of 
American liberalism works well enough on its own terms. Indeed, the story’s tight organ-
ization makes for gripping reading. Occasionally, however, it seems rather too neat, too 
focused on the unfolding of a plot of its own creation, and not attentive enough to the 
myriad factors—not least those Kruse and Laats and other scholars of conservatism fo-
cus on—that might equally have contributed to the undoing of liberalism. This is, of 
course, a criticism that can be leveled at any historical account that offers a clean narra-
tive thread and is hardly fatal. I suspect that some scholars might also take issue with 
Schiller’s contention that late twentieth century America retained its commitment to anti-
discrimination. The rolling back of affirmative action, the attacks on voting rights, the 
large-scale incarceration of racial minorities, the mass deportations of immigrants that 
disproportionately affect families of color, and the recent spate of police brutality vis-à-
vis African Americans suggest otherwise. 
II. READING KRUSE, LAATS, AND SCHILLER AGAINST A LONGER INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY  
In this part, I attempt to make sense of the books by Kruse, Laats, and Schiller in 
terms of a longer intellectual history. In reading the books, I was struck by how much all 
three seem to circle around similar themes, or reveal similar phenomena, that are never 
made explicit because they are not the central preoccupations of the authors. In order to 
see these themes, however, we will need to begin in the nineteenth century and move 
forward into the twentieth. 
For much of the nineteenth century (and certainly long before that), American le-
gal, political, and intellectual elites were committed to varieties of what we might loosely 
call “foundational thinking,” by which I mean ways of explaining or accounting for the 
world in terms of ahistorical foundations. Nineteenth-century America was an over-
whelmingly religious society. The belief that a Christian God underlay the political, le-
gal, and social order was pervasive. Religion played a powerful role in multiple realms 
of life, from the form of the family to the structure of welfare to the institutions of educa-
tion. It was frequently employed to justify (but also to oppose) existing political, legal, 
and social arrangements. Even where American thinkers came up with secular alterna-
tives to “God” as explanations for their world (alternatives that traveled under names like 
“nature,” “society,” “history,” and so on), such alternatives possessed rather “God”-like 
characteristics. They were frequently assigned the status of unalterable truth and deemed 
governed by ineluctable and unshakeable laws. 
The pervasiveness of foundational thinking limited and constrained the imagined 
space of democratic decision-making and individual self-making. If the world was sub-
ject to unshakeable laws that were not of man’s making, were not democratic decision-
making and individual self-making cabined by such “laws”? The widespread sense of 
given constraints could thus block the increasingly energetic claims to full participation 
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in the polity made by women, racial minorities, and the economically and physically dis-
advantaged. To take just one example, in Bradwell v. Illinois (1873), the U.S. Supreme 
Court was asked to consider the applicability of the recently enacted Fourteenth 
Amendment to an Illinois law that barred women from the practice of law. At the time, 
women activists were already a few decades into their quest to obtain political and other 
kinds of parity with men. In a concurring opinion upholding the Illinois’ law and thus 
rejecting the claim of the female complainant, Justice Bradley invoked “[t]he law of the 
Creator” and “the “nature of things” to argue that “it is not every citizen of every age, 
sex, and condition that is qualified for every calling and profession.”25 “God” and “na-
ture” could thus serve as bars to women’s attempts to enter professions. Similar argu-
ments would be made to justify the denial of suffrage to women, racial minorities, and 
paupers. 
However, the widespread sense of given constraints did not only limit the claims of 
women, racial minorities, and the poor. It also shaped understandings of the legitimate 
spheres of democratic politics and law. To the extent that the sphere of democratic poli-
tics was imagined as restricted by a set of given constraints, non-democratically generat-
ed law occupied a large space in the polity. As many scholars have noted, throughout the 
nineteenth century, an entrenched and largely unelected common law judiciary played a 
highly significant role in shaping the rules that governed American society. This is not to 
say that the common law judiciary had no democratically-inclined challengers in nine-
teenth-century America. But common law thinkers were able to defend themselves quite 
successfully against such challengers. They repeatedly argued that the common law was 
far better able than democratically-elected legislatures to instantiate the foundational 
laws of “nature,” “history,” or “society.” At the same time, insofar as common lawyers 
claimed continuity with the common law’s “immemorial” past, promised to change legal 
arrangements with great solicitude for precedent, and asserted that only they were well-
equipped to declare the customs of the community, common lawyers also promised nine-
teenth-century Americans a measure of solidarity, a solidarity that bound past, present, 
and future together in a century of dramatic changes.26 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, however, one can detect a broad-based 
challenge to foundational thinking, both in Europe and the United States, in multiple 
realms of intellectual, political, social, and cultural life. At the risk of simplification, we 
might loosely group these challenges under the rubric of “modernism.” 
“Modernism,” the historian Peter Gay argued, “is far easier to exemplify than to 
define.”27 While it is beyond the scope of this review essay to come to terms with the 
multiple meanings and manifestations of modernism, it is significant that Gay identifies 
as the key attributes of modernism “the lure of heresy,” on the one hand, and “a com-
mitment to a principled self-scrutiny,” on the other.28 Briefly put, modernism entailed a 
“heretical” questioning of hitherto un-interrogated foundations (philosophical, religious, 
                                                            
 25. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 26.  I make this argument in KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 
1790–1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM (2011).  
 27. Id. at 5. 
 28.  PETER GAY, MODERNISM: THE LURE OF HERESY FROM BAUDELAIRE TO BECKETT AND BEYOND 1, 3-4 
(2008). 
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aesthetic, logical, natural, and so on). Typically, this questioning took the form of sub-
jecting such foundations to the acid bath of history. Once the pretended ahistorical foun-
dations of political, legal, social, or aesthetic arrangements and conventions were shown 
to have merely temporal origins, and were thus revealed to be entirely historical phe-
nomena, they could be re-imagined. Whether at the level of democratic decision-making 
or individual self-making, “principled self-scrutiny” in the here and now bespoke open-
ness to new arrangements, a willingness, even a commitment, to experiment and inno-
vate. Nothing exemplified this approach better than the United States’ own homegrown, 
modernist philosophical tradition: pragmatism. 
The impact of modernist, anti-foundational thinking bore dramatic implications for 
the interrelated realms of endeavor that are the subject of the three books under review, 
namely, the organization of the spheres of law and democratic politics as they related to 
one another, education, and religion. As we shall see, each was shot through with strains 
of pragmatist thinking.  I discuss each in turn. 
Modernist, anti-foundational thinking resulted in a significant expansion of the im-
agined possible space of democratic deliberation. Simply put, as the older sense that 
there were given, unshakeable, fixed truths and constraints receded, what was left but to 
arrive at preferred solutions through democratic deliberation? Beginning in the late nine-
teenth century and continuing into the mid-twentieth, women, racial minorities, workers 
and others interrogated the “natural” and other established or fixed hierarchies that had 
so long subjected them to lesser citizenship and economic exploitation. A range of re-
formers—from consumer advocates to urban planners—questioned entrenched arrange-
ments, demanded creative new solutions and expressed a willingness to borrow from 
other countries. 
At the same time, modernist anti-foundational ideas resulted in a major redrawing 
of the boundaries that separated law and democratic politics. A key architect of this re-
thinking was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who was part of the first generation of pragma-
tist thinkers such as William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Chauncey Wright. In 
the celebrated opening lines of Holmes’s The Common Law, the reader was famously 
told that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”29 The common 
law could not, Holmes insisted, be shown to embody ahistorical logic or reason.30 In-
deed, Holmes showed that common law doctrine was little more than an agglomeration 
of inadvertent errors and confusions that had arisen in historical time. It followed, for 
Holmes, that the common law’s antiquity did not entitle it to special regard. In The Path 
of the Law, he put it thus: 
 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and 
                                                            
 29. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). I discuss Holmes’s historical sensibility 
in Kunal M. Parker, The History of Experience: On the Historical Imagination of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
26 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 60 (2003). 
 30. See id. 
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the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.31 
 
As the twentieth century dawned, the Holmesian critique of the common law be-
gan to attract large numbers of adherents. As the United States began to confront the 
problems of immigration, urbanization, and capital-labor conflict, critics argued the 
country’s entrenched common law sensibilities, especially as instantiated in the pro-
nouncements of a pro-capital and anti-labor federal judiciary, were impeding the search 
for solutions to urgent social and political problems. The activities of the U.S. Supreme 
Court lent credence to such critiques. In the infamous case of Lochner v. New York, the 
Court effectively read common law freedoms into the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process 
Clause when it struck down as unconstitutional a New York maximum-hours law intend-
ed to regulate working conditions in bakeries on the ground that it interfered with the 
right to contract.32 
As decisions such as Lochner were handed down, the contemporaneous interroga-
tion of law’s foundations allowed Progressive Era critics to read the common law as 
nothing other than a species of reactionary politics, a usurpation of the legitimate sphere 
of democratic politics. In order to restore to democratic majorities their rightful role in 
giving themselves their own laws, there began a long, complex, and contradictory assault 
on the common law extending all the way to the New Deal. By 1940, in the face of the 
democratically-sanctioned, scientifically-informed, and result-oriented law represented 
by the regulatory state, the common law had retreated. Common lawyers would no long-
er enjoy the prestige and authority they had enjoyed in the nineteenth century. 
Modernist, anti-foundational ideas were equally (if not more) influential in the 
realm of education, where Progressive Era reformers sought to transform the school to 
produce a new type of citizen. Nobody linked education and democracy more firmly than 
John Dewey, America’s most famous twentieth-century philosopher and the foremost 
exponent of philosophical pragmatism. From 1896 to 1903, Dewey headed the Laborato-
ry School at the University of Chicago, the name alone conveying the pragmatist turning 
away from foundations and simultaneous commitment to experiment. While the Labora-
tory School was not free of hierarchies between teachers and students, it was explicitly 
conceived as an embryonic democratic society and did more to encourage collective de-
liberation and decision-making by students than almost all other schools at the time. In 
the words of the political theorist Amy Gutmann, within the logic of Dewey’s education-
al program “teachers must be sufficiently connected to their communities to understand 
the commitments that their students bring to school, and sufficiently detached to cultivate 
among their students the critical distance necessary to reconsider commitments in the 
face of conflicting ones.”33 
Modernism and pragmatism also came together in the realm of religion, not least in 
the figure of mid-twentieth century America’s most famous theologian, Reinhold Nie-
                                                            
 31.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., The Path of the Law, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE 
HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 399 
(Sheldon Novick ed., 1995). 
 32. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 33.  AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION: WITH A NEW PREFACE AND EPILOGUE 77 (1999). 
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buhr. In his classic text, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragma-
tism, Cornel West explicitly characterizes Niebuhr as a pragmatist, religious liberal deep-
ly committed to the primacy of scientific solutions to social problems and profoundly 
skeptical of “pre-scientific” and “primitive” thought.34 For Niebuhr, Biblical eschatology 
was only “symbolic.” He famously stated: “I do not know how it is possible to believe in 
anything pertaining to God and eternity ‘literally.’”35 He shocked a Catholic interviewer 
by saying: “Now I don’t think that anybody really believes in the resurrection of the 
body.”36 
Even as modernist, pragmatist, anti-foundational ideas coursed through the realms 
of law, politics, education, and religion, it is important to remember that many of the fig-
ures in the rethinking of these realms saw themselves as dealing with interconnected 
problems and crossed disciplinary boundaries freely. Thus, John Dewey, America’s most 
famous pragmatist philosopher of education, occasionally thought and wrote about law. 
In 1941, he wrote a little essay describing his philosophy of law that could be read as a 
blue-print for the New Deal administrative state. He distinguished sharply between 
pragmatic approaches to law, on the one hand, and foundational approaches to law rest-
ing upon “external sources,” on the other. By “external sources,” Dewey was referring to 
sources imagined to be outside history. He listed as examples “the Will or Reason of 
God, the Law of Nature in medieval theory and in philosophers like Grotius and his suc-
cessors, the General Will of Rousseau, and the Practical Reason of Kant.”37 In contrast 
to such metaphysical approaches to law, Dewey argued, pragmatic approaches to law 
were to emerge from, and be judged in terms of, “experience.”38 This grounding in “ex-
perience” demanded that “intelligence, employing the best scientific methods and mate-
rials available, be used to investigate, in terms of the context of actual situations, the 
consequence of legal rules and of proposed legal decisions and acts of legislation.”39 
If America’s then most famous philosopher provided a blue-print for the New 
Deal, the connections between pragmatic, modernist legal thought and pragmatic reli-
gious thought are evident in a little exchange between two friends of long-standing, 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Felix Frankfurter. A Harvard Law School professor, a figure in 
government, and then a Roosevelt appointee to the U.S. Supreme Court, Frankfurter 
clearly saw himself as continuing the pragmatist legacy of Holmes and Brandeis. In his 
reminiscences, he wrote: 
 
I am very much interested in theological discussions, theological prob-
lems, and one of my close friends, one of my esteemed friends is Dr. 
Reinhold Niebuhr, and he and I have had talks on this subject from 
time to time. We summered together for some years up in Heath, a 
small town in Western Massachusetts. Once, a few summers ago, I 
                                                            
 34.  See CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 156 
(1989). 
 35. Id. at 157. 
 36.  Id.  
 37. John Dewey, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 81 (1941). 
 38. See id. 
 39.  Id. at 81, 84. 
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went to a community church there, a nondenominational church to 
which people of the community except the Catholics go, because I had 
heard that Reinhold Niebuhr was going to deliver the sermon. He did 
deliver the sermon, a nondenominational sermon, and after the service, 
I said to him, “Reinie, may a believing unbeliever thank you for your 
sermon?” He said, “may an unbelieving believer thank you for appre-
ciating it?”40 
 
Politics, law, education, and religion, as they were reconceived by a set of influen-
tial thinkers in mid-century America, stood at the shadowy boundary between “belief” 
and “unbelief.” The books of Kruse, Laats, and Schiller all concern this boundary, albeit 
in different ways. 
As stated above, Kruse explicitly locates mid-twentieth century America’s public 
embrace of religiosity in political opposition to the New Deal. It is thus the pragmatist 
mood of early twentieth-century America as instantiated in the form of the New Deal 
state that conservatives were reacting against. But it is in Laats’s book that conservative 
opposition to pragmatist thinking—specifically, the figure of John Dewey—comes 
across most pointedly. 
In the early 1940s, the National Association of Manufacturers (an organization that 
also plays a critical role in Kruse’s book) published a list of hundreds of school text-
books that it accused of maintaining an “un-American tone.” The American Legion also 
declared its opposition. Among the targets were popular school textbooks written by 
Harold Rugg, who was part of a self-styled group called “frontier thinkers” based largely 
at the Columbia Teachers’ College. However, the real enemy was the Teachers College 
itself, an institution particularly influenced by and associated with John Dewey. Laats 
quotes a Seattle commentator who warned that “John Dewey Groups” at Columbia Uni-
versity were promoting “schemes to overthrow our system of government.”41 
Opposition to the figure of Dewey continued in the post-World War II period. In 
1950s California, conservatives were set against the “pragmatic flexibility” that school 
superintendents sought to bring to the city’s school system.42 The conservative thinker 
who most influenced California educational conservatives, Allen Zoll, held the “tragic 
and terrifying” philosophy of John Dewey responsible for the crisis in education.43 Ac-
cording to Zoll, progressive educators had sought to discredit the American way of life 
and capitalism through influencing education. But it was Dewey’s philosophy that had 
“eliminated the notion of permanent truths or values.”44 
Laats’s last substantive chapter deals with a textbook controversy in Kanawha 
County, West Virginia that is widely taken to mark the birth of the “New Right.” During 
this period, conservatives shifted from attacking communism to attacking “secular hu-
manism”; their activities gave rise to institutions such as the Heritage Foundation and to 
                                                            
 40. FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 291 (Harlan B. Phillips ed., 1960). 
 41.  LAATS, supra note 7, at 84 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 42.  Id. at 130. 
 43.  Id. at 148. 
 44.  Id. at 149. 
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an explosion in the number of Christian schools. But even in the 1970s, the era’s leading 
educational conservatives, the Gablers, laid the blame for America’s schools on the “de-
clared atheist,” John Dewey, who had promoted progressive education on the basis of the 
idea that “there was no absolute transcendental God, Bible, or system of beliefs.”45 
If we are wont to think that American conservatives mobilized in opposition to 
Communism or Socialism, secularism, or the political demands of women and minori-
ties, both Kruse and Laats, but especially the latter, show us how much conservative op-
position in America has been directed against a modernist philosophical tradition that is 
uniquely the country’s own. If American conservatives have long demonized unsavory 
ideas as foreign imports, they have also demonized the country’s own anti-foundational 
traditions. 
But even as conservatives were inveighing against pragmatist approaches, they 
might in fact have been borrowing from them. What I found most intriguing about 
Kruse’s book was that the religious symbols and slogans that conservatives mobilized in 
opposition to the anti-foundational, pragmatist New Deal were as “thin,” as flattened, as 
superficial, and as devoid of foundations as they were. 
As Kruse observes, the post-war period witnessed the introduction of phrases such 
as “One Nation Under God” and “In God We Trust.”46 These were slapped onto curren-
cy, stamps, pedestals, and podiums, recited at the opening of events, and featured all over 
public institutions. Even at the time, however, the effort was read as offering up a denud-
ed, thinned out religiosity. In the congressional debate over inscribing “In God We 
Trust” on coins, Representative Abraham Multer of Brooklyn argued that such efforts 
ultimately debased God and were entirely ineffectual: “I don’t believe it has inspired one 
single person to be more religious because we have these words on our currency.”47 
When the effort to pass a constitutional prayer amendment was under foot, some con-
gressmen ardently in support of the amendment were astonished to learn that that opposi-
tion came from religious leaders. But religious leaders recognized that such efforts were 
attempting to detach something from highly particular traditions and to set it afloat with-
out foundations. “It seems that to many of the proponents [of the school prayer amend-
ment] ‘prayer is prayer,’” said Reverend Dean Kelley of the National Council of 
Churches.48 “They seem unable to realize that some devoutly religious citizens, at least, 
care what the content of prayer is, and do not wish to engage in a prayer whose content is 
so vague or innocuous as to be ‘non-sectarian.’”49 So thin, superficial, and devoid of 
foundation was the post-war religious symbology, in fact, that contemporary legal schol-
ars argued that there was nothing in it that threatened the constitutionally mandated sepa-
ration of church and state. This was merely “ceremonial deism,” claimed Yale Law 
School Dean Eugene Rostow, “so conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitu-
tional.”50 
What should one make of the “thin” religiosity that was everywhere in the post-
                                                            
 45.  Id. at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46.  KRUSE, supra note 1, at xvi. 
 47.  Id. at 119. 
 48. Id. at 218. 
 49.  Id.   
 50.  Id. at xv (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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war period? Could this be, perhaps, a particularly modernist response to the erosion of 
the substantive content and specific eschatalogies of religion under the impact of anti-
foundational thinking? Contra Kruse, then, could one think of inscriptions on currency 
as a marker of “Christian America” only if mid-century “Christian America” is under-
stood to be partaking of the “unbelieving belief” of a pragmatist theologian such as Nie-
buhr? Could the same “thin” tradition be uncovered in the thinking of the educational 
conservatives who are the subject of Laats’s book? Although Laats does not concern 
himself with this question, I suspect that this might be the case. 
Law in relationship to democratic politics underwent a similar “thinning out.” This 
story is hardly unknown, but bears mentioning because it is more or less absent in Schil-
ler’s account and complicates it somewhat. 
The triumph of democratic majoritarianism that the New Deal represented was not 
necessarily viewed as such by all concerned. In the 1920s and 1930s, authoritarianism—
whether in its German, Italian, or Russian versions—appeared to many to be the way of 
the future. Authoritarian states seemed able to marshal the resources necessary to mobi-
lize societies and economies in ways that liberal democracies, beset as they were with 
constitutional restrictions on state power, seemed unable to do. It is not surprising, then, 
the New Deal regulatory state that emerged in the 1930s, borrowing as it did from the 
administrative models of the authoritarian states, sparked a great deal of anxiety. If it 
represented the triumph of democratic majoritarianism to some, it seemed to signal its 
demise to others. 
Conservatives were hardly the only ones concerned. In the 1930s, Harvard Law 
School’s Dean Roscoe Pound, who had been one of the pioneers of Sociological Juris-
prudence in the early twentieth century, began to sound more and more like an orthodox 
common lawyer as he criticized the emerging administrative state. From August 19-21, 
1936, Pound convened a “Conference on the Future of the Common Law” at the Harvard 
Law School at which he hailed the common law as “a taught tradition of voluntary sub-
jection of authority and power to reason whether evidenced by medieval charters or by 
immemorial custom or by the covenant of a sovereign people to rule according to de-
clared principles of right or justice.”51 Pound criticized the administrative state as fol-
lows: “There are those today who would think of everything which is done officially as 
law. Such is not the common-law teaching. Not administration as law but the requiring 
of administration to conform to rule and form and reason is the common-law ideal.”52 
Vesting too much power in the administrative state, Pound feared, would make the Unit-
ed States approach the Soviet system: “[I]n the socialist state there can be no law but on-
ly administrative ordinances and orders.”53 
Pound need not have worried too much. As it turned out, the American administra-
tive state that emerged by 1940—for all its claims to be the triumph of democratic ma-
joritarianism—was in fact hemmed in, shot through, and beset by law. Daniel Ernst has 
recently written about how common law judges and lawyers compelled the emerging ca-
                                                            
 51. Roscoe Pound, What is the Common Law, in THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW 1, 10-11 (Peter Smith 
ed., 1965). 
 52. Id. at 17. 
 53.  Id.  
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dre of administrators to conform to common law norms.54 While it is beyond the scope 
of this review essay to discuss the ways in which the administrative state was regulated 
by law as it emerged, it might be worth emphasizing that Felix Frankfurter, who was 
such an important intellectual architect of the American administrative state, considered 
law absolutely central to it. This is what Frankfurter wrote as early as 1913. 
 
The problems ahead are economic and sociological, and the added ad-
justments of a government under a written constitution, steeped in le-
galistic traditions, to the assumption of the right solution of such prob-
lems. To an important degree therefore, the problems are problems of 
jurisprudence—not only the shaping of a jurisprudence to meet the so-
cial and industrial needs of the time, but the great procedural problems 
of administration and legislation, because of the inevitable link be-
tween law and legislation, the lawyers’ natural relation to these issues, 
the close connection between all legislation and constitutional law, and 
the traditional, easily accountable dominance of the lawyer in our pub-
lic affairs. In the synthesis of thinking that must shape the Great State, 
the lawyer is in many ways the coordinator, the mediator, between the 
various social sciences.55 
 
Frankfurter’s focus on “the great procedural problems of administration and legis-
lation”—and his understanding of the role of the lawyer as “the coordinator, the media-
tor, between the various social sciences”—suggests the role that law was to play in the 
new administrative order.56 It was to specify, or stand for, process. This was a “thinning 
out” of sorts. In a post-foundational world, once law had abandoned its claim to embody 
logic, reason, morality, the customs of the people, and the accumulated wisdom of the 
ages, it shrank insofar as it became process, the ability to specify the ways in which the 
multiple orders of the new state interacted with each other. This was precisely what the 
Legal Process school, the dominant jurisprudential style of the 1950s, attempted to do. 
When Schiller stages the “structural flaws” of post-war liberalism as the clash be-
tween democratic majoritarianism (labor law) and anti-majoritarianism (fair employment 
law), he leaves out two important implications of law’s “thinning out” into process. First, 
the democratic majoritarianism of the administrative state was always shot through with 
procedural constraints derived from the common law, i.e., the very body of anti-
majoritarian law the administrative state was designed to supersede. Second, the mid-
twentieth century “thinning out” of law into process created, at least for a while, an en-
tente between democratic politics and law. Democratic majorities could govern them-
selves so long as they respected procedural norms. This entente was thrown into crisis 
somewhat by the Civil Rights movement, of which the “anti-majoritarian” fair employ-
ment norms identified by Schiller are a part. It is noteworthy, then, that opposition to the 
                                                            
 54.  DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 
1900–1940 (2014). 
 55. FRANKFURTER, supra note 40, at 81. 
 56. Id. at 81. 
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Warren Court’s anti-discrimination and individual rights jurisprudence from within the 
legal community came in important part from those who accused it of not respecting the 
right procedures and who saw in decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 
a return to the jurisprudence of the Lochner era. Felix Frankfurter, the intellectual archi-
tect of the New Deal, became a conservative on the Warren Court. His clerk, Alexander 
Bickel, who coined the phrase “the counter-majoritarian difficulty” spoke of “passive 
virtues” (most of them procedural) that he accused the Warren Court of ignoring to its 
peril.57 Schiller’s account of the “structural flaws” of liberalism, then, does not suffi-
ciently recognize that, on the one hand, democratic majoritarianism was itself thoroughly 
legal and that, on the other, it was legal thinkers who opposed in important part the 
“counter-majoritarian” legal norms that were used to check democratic majoritarianism 
in the 1960s. This could be a valuable addition to his story. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In situating Kruse, Laats, and Schiller in terms of a longer intellectual history, I 
have sought to show how mid-twentieth century law, politics, religion, and education 
were all, in distinct but also related ways, tied up with the broad attack on foundational 
thinking, on the one hand, and with the various responses to it, on the other. Notions of 
tradition, religion, and law were all invoked to counteract modernist developments in the 
realms of education and politics. But in challenging these modernist developments, there 
would be no easy or uncomplicated return to the world before modernism. Law, religion, 
and perhaps tradition would endure a “thinning out” of sorts in their attempt to win back 
a role for themselves. Of course, all I am suggesting is that this was a particular kind of 
mid-century response to the problems that anti-foundational thinking posed for American 
thinkers. Nothing here should exhaust the other meanings of law, religion, and tradition 
in the same period. 
In American history, I submit, we need more mappings of the forms that modernist 
thinking took and of the myriad responses to these forms. The three books reviewed here 
are part of that process.  
 
                                                            
 57.  I discuss Bickel’s thought in Kunal M. Parker, How Law Should Avoid Mistakes: Alexander Bickel’s 
Modernist Jurisprudence of Mood, in LAW’S MISTAKES (Austin Sarat et al., eds.,  2016).   
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